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ABSTRACT
We discuss recent cases of Chinese buyout activity in the OECD (especially in the US and the EU)
in resource and manufacturing sectors. While most of the buyout attempts have been unsuccessful,
they can serve as a catalyst for a wider discussion on the implications for global arrangements over
cross border acquisitions. Three specific issues are discussed. The first is the subsidization of
purchase raised in the OECD in response to the advancing of low- or no-interest loans by the
Chinese Central Bank to companies investing abroad. The second is the transparency of entities
involved in the buyout attempt. Most Chinese companies have close ties to the multiple levels of
government and are not subject to the standard reporting requirements as required of OECD
companies. The third involves national security concerns in the OECD and the possibility of
acquiring sensitive technology by Chinese companies when they purchase companies abroad. These
issues have not been addressed in the existing OECD/WTO investment policy initiatives and have
yet to be discussed in the global fora.
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  This paper discusses the recent wave of (both actual and proposed) buyouts by 
Chinese  companies  of  entities  outside  China.  While  the  majority  of  these  have  not 
resulted in completed transactions, we discuss whether these can be a catalyst for a wider 
discussion of the implications for global arrangements over cross border acquisitions. 
Chinese outward foreign direct investment (FDI) for some years has been relatively small 
(in the US$3-4 billion range in 2004) and heavily concentrated on both greenfield and 
joint venture activity, much of it occurring in Hong Kong. In the last year, a change 
which has occurred is both a focus on direct acquisition and the emergence of potentially 
large transactions, some in the US$15-20 billion range, and with a focus well beyond 
Hong  Kong. Examples include: the  Lenovo buyout of  IBM's PC business, CNOOC's 
(China National Offshore Oil Company) bid for Unocal, prospective bids by MinMetals 
for  Noranda,  the  Haier  Group  bid  for  Maytag,  and  others.  No  direct  World  Trade 
Organization (WTO) issues are raised by these, but questions of subsidization, lack of 
transparency,  and  national  security  have  all  been  raised.  National  security  issues 
regarding foreign acquisitions are not new and go back to the Exon-Florio provisions of 
the American Defence Production Act of 1998 following concerns in the US in the late 
1980's over Japanese buyouts. However, issues of subsidization of foreign acquisitions 
through low interest loans from central banks and the transparency of organizational form 
of acquiring entities (State-Owned Enterprises, (SOEs)) are new.  
  The overarching feature that we stress and which goes well beyond China is the 
apparent  absence  of  globally  agreed  disciplines  covering  not  only  cross  border 3 
acquisitions,  but  more  broadly  all  cross  border  factor  flows.  This  situation  stands  in 
contrast to the goods and services flows covered by the WTO. Both the failed multilateral 
agreement on investment (MAI) and WTO competition policy negotiations did not touch 
directly on the newer issues in recent debate on Chinese buyouts, and neither do earlier 
bilateral trade and investment treaties.  
  At first glance this upsurge of new outward Chinese FDI strikes outside observers 
as odd. China is after all, still a relatively capital scarce economy with a large pool of low 
wage  labour,  and  development  policy  there  remains  focused  on  attracting  inward 
platform FDI to combine with low wage labour to fuel further export and GDP growth. 
To begin exporting large amounts of capital through large foreign acquisitions when this 
broad stance of development policy towards inward FDI remains unchanged seemingly 
calls for an explanation.  
  A  number  of  factors  underlie  this  recent  upsurge  in  Chinese  cross  border 
acquisition activity. One is large accumulated Central Bank reserves in China (close to 
US$700  billion),  and  a  seeming  change  in  policy  stance  by  the  Central  Bank  of 
advancing  low  interest  loans  to  SOEs  for  foreign  acquisitions  rather  than  continued 
accumulation of US treasury notes. Chinese concerns over security for supply of resource 
inputs (especially oil) for Chinese manufacturing enterprises also motivate the change in 
activity. And for private manufacturing groups in China, the use of foreign acquisitions 
as  a  way  of  obtaining  distribution  networks  in  the  Organisation  of  Economic  Co-
operation and Development (OECD) for domestic manufacturing production (insourcing 
for want of a better term) seems to be a factor. The picture is one of macro imbalances 4 
combining  with  pragmatic  niche  driven  foreign  acquisition  activity  in  which  factors 
behind  both  Chinese  SOEs  and  private  groups,  and  resource  and  manufacturing 
acquisitions differ.  
  With both Chinese trade surpluses and inward FDI continuing to grow, and most 
likely outward Chinese FDI growing correspondingly, broader systemic implications are 
likely to factor in discussion of buyout situations. Mundell (1957) years ago noted the 
formal  equivalence  between  goods  flows  and  factor  flows  suggesting  an  equivalent 
organizational form for GATT/WTO for goods flows. Given the recent failures first of 
the MAI negotiation in the OECD, and then of the competition policy negotiations in the 
WTO, no global rules apply to interventions by governments regulating these forms of 
factor flow. Issues of subsidization, mutually agreed bindings on barriers to acquisitions, 
and transparency of organizational form of acquiring firms are thus newly raised.  
  We  discuss  existing  policy  initiatives  both  in  the  OECD  and  the  WTO  with 
respect to investment and competition policy in light of the new issues raised by Chinese 
acquisitions. Thus far, central banks around the world have not engaged in extending low 
interest  loans  for  foreign  acquisitions,  but  the  policy  structure  in  China  with  large 
communally owned production units (by national, provincial and municipal governments) 
makes this logical from a Chinese standpoint.  
  A issue is whether other countries should now seek to link approval of individual 
transactions to negotiations (or renegotiations) of bilateral investment treaties. A broader 
approach is to seek a global regulatory framework covering purchases by prospective 
foreign  parent  entities,  a  matter  rarely  touched  on  by  previous  WTO  and  OECD 5 
investment discussions which have largely focused on translating existing system of trade 
rules (National Treatment and MFN) into investment rules.6 
2. Chinese Outward FDI and Factors Behind It 
  Existing  literature  discussing  FDI  in  China  is  dominated  by  evaluation  of  the 
impact of FDI inflows on the Chinese economy, and specifically how central they are to 
continued growth performance.
1 FDI inflows in recent years have been running at US$60 
billion/year  and  exports  from  foreign  invested  enterprises  now  account  for  half  of 
manufactured exports, which in turn equal 80% of value added in manufacturing. If a 
downturn  in  inward  FDI  occurred  in  China,  it  is  feared  this  could  adversely  impact 
Chinese growth performance. 
  Until recently, Chinese outward FDI was relatively small, and largely greenfield 
or joint venture, with much of it focused on inward flows from Hong Kong.
2 But the 
recent widely publicized proposed buyouts of North American companies, have turned 
attention to China as a foreign investor. Chinese FDI is global but has been concentrated 
outside of the OECD. In 2003, 80% was in Asia, 14.3% in Latin America, 1.7% in North 
America,  1.5%  each  in  Europe  and  Africa,  and  1.4%  in  Oceania.
3  The  top  five  
destinations for Chinese investment in 2003 were Hong Kong, the Cayman Islands, the 
Virgin  Islands, the United States, and Macao, followed by Australia, the Republic of 
Korea  and  Singapore  and  was  concentrated  in  three  sectors:  information  technology, 
computers and software (33% in 2003), distribution, wholesale and retail (20%),  and 
                                                 
1  See for example: Graham, Wada (2001), Liu, Burridge, Sinclair (2002), Berthélemy, Démurger (2000), 
Ng, Tuan (2001); Tian, Lin, Lo (2004). 
2  Chinese  Academy  of  International  Trade  and  Economic  Cooperation  (CAITEC)  and  Welsh 
Development  Agency  (WDA)  (2005),  Chinese  Enterprises'  Expansion  Into  European  and  North 
American Markets 
3  CAITEC, WDA (2005). 7 
mining (18%).
4 In 2004, Chinese outward investment was only US$3.62 billion, with 
only 5% of FDI flowing into China, despite the growth rate of outward FDI that had been 
twice that of inward FDI in prior years (in 2004, 27% and 13% respectively, year on 
year).  
  Existing  literature  discussing  both  the  motivation  for  and  strategies  used  in 
Chinese  outward  FDI
5  emphasize  access  to  resources,  foreign  distribution  systems, 
foreign  technology,  markets  abroad,  and  the  strategic  aims  and  perceived  needs  for  
diversification of individual enterprises. These reasons for enterprises investing abroad 
are not substantially different from those of other countries.  
  A recent joint study undertaken by the Chinese Academy of International Trade 
and Economic Cooperation (CAITEC) and the Welsh Development Agency (WDA) used 
a questionnaire to investigate key factors involved in Chinese outward FDI and found 
that the most influential to the decision were: market expansion, implementation of long-
term  development  strategies  for  firms,  access  to  technology,  learning  advanced 
management methods, avoiding trade barriers, taking advantage of foreign preferential 
investment policies, achieving cost reductions, acquisition of material inputs (resources), 
and transferring excess production capacity abroad.
6 Other studies point to non-economic 
reasons  for  Chinese  enterprises  investing  abroad,  such  as  the  possibility  of  gaining 
residency rights and other benefits in the host country for managerial staff (such as health 
                                                 
4  CAITEC, WDA (2005). 
5  See for example: Hong and Sun (2004), Deng (2004 and 2003), Wall (1997), Wong and Chan (2003), 
Yang (2003), Young, Huang and McDermott (1996), Wu and Chen (2001), UNCTAD (2003), Wang 
(2002) and others. 
6  CAITEC, WDA (2005). 8 
services, social security, and access to education). The use of overseas investments as a 
way to circumvent official Chinese restrictions on access to foreign exchange and foreign 
capital markets is also raised as potential factor.
7 
  The decision by Chinese companies to buy foreign companies is also often linked 
to an intent to relocate manufacturing activity to China to benefit from lower labour costs 
while  keeping  existing  distribution  networks  in  the  host  country  of  the  acquired 
business.
8 Recent widely publicized Chinese bids for large firms in the OECD are also 
portrayed in the media as involving a 'prestige factor', viewed as an incentive for Chinese 
companies to go abroad to either buy a recognizable foreign brand (Lenovo's takeover of 
IBM’s PC business) or build their own brand's awareness by establishing manufacturing 
plants in the target country (such as Haier's factory in South Carolina, US).  
  In 2003, SOEs accounted for only 43% of total Chinese investments abroad with 
limited  liability,  shareholding  and  private  companies  taken  together  accounting  for 
another 43%.
9 With recent large scale acquisition activity these proportions seems poised 
to change. Chinese government policy is now to use outward oriented investments to 
secure access to resources and raw materials (especially iron ore, coal, oil and natural 
gas), acquire new technology for transfer back to China, expand Chinese export markets, 
strengthen international relationships with and gain more influence in other countries.  
  Chinese  outward  FDI  thus  also  reflects  official  Chinese  government  policy  to 
                                                 
7  Deng (2004).  
8  Such as recently with Nanjing and MG Rover. 
9  CAITEC, WDA (2005) 9 
encourage domestic enterprises to invest abroad. This is to be supported by the use of low 
interest loans made available to Chinese SOEs and financed by China's large and growing 
foreign reserves. These reserves were around US$15 billion in 1998 and today stand at 
close  to  US$700  billion  reflecting  both  Chinese  trade  surpluses  in  recent  years  and 
inward foreign investment. With concerns in China over security of supply of resource 
inputs, and the impact of recent falls in the US dollar on the US treasuries in the reserve 
portfolio, deploying Chinese reserves in this way is seen as a reasonable policy. The 
government regulatory approval process for overseas investment projects have also been 
significantly  simplified  in  the  recent  years
10,  further  fuelling  outward  FDI  flows.
11 
Chinese companies are now supported by low interest loans if their overseas activity 
involves,  among  others,  resource  exploration,  acquiring  foreign  advanced  technology, 
developing global competitiveness of the company and expanding its markets.
12  
  The changes taking place in Chinese outward oriented foreign investment are well 
illustrated by recent takeover attempts by Chinese companies. We summarize them in 
Table 1, and then discuss each in more detail. The circumstances of each episode vary, 
and firm information on the terms of the arrangements entered into in each case is not 
                                                 
10 For  example,  the  threshold  for  seeking  state  approval  for  a  planned  foreign  investment  has  been 
increased from US$1 million to US$20 million. Investments not bigger than US$30 million need to be 
approved  only  by  the  provincial  government.  See  http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2004-12-
03/08404420072s.shtml  
11 “Provisions  on  matters  related  to  the  examination  and  approval  of  establishment  of  enterprises  for 
overseas investment” announced by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce and “Interim measures on the 
administration of examination and approval of overseas investment” by State Development and Reform 
Commission (SDRC). 
12 “Notice on the policy of giving credit support to the state encouraged key overseas investment projects” 
announced by the State Development and Reform  Commission (SDRC) and the  China Import and 
Export Bank in 2004. 10 
always readily available, but the factors involved in each case seem clear. 
 
 
2.1. Resource Company Situations 
CNPC/Yukos 
  The  involvement  of  China's  National  Petroleum  Corporation  (CNPC)  in  the 
Russian oil company Yukos, following its tax problems, illustrates well how Chinese 
concerns with security of resource supplies are fuelling foreign acquisitions of resource 
companies.  In  September  2004,  facing  financial  problems  due  to  back  taxes,  Yukos 
announced that it was suspending close to 60% of its total oil exports to China due to 
high shipping costs.
13 CNPC then entered into talks with Yukos about restarting  rail 
deliveries  of  crude  oil  to  China.  In  December  2004,  Russia's  Energy  Minister  V. 
Khristenko indicated that CNPC might take a 20% stake in Yukos's former oil production 
                                                 
13 People's  Daily  Online,  September  22,  2004,  CNPC  seeks  to  resume  Yukos  oil  shipments,  
http://english.people.com.cn/200409/22/eng20040922_157934.html 11 
unit, Yuganskneftegas, as part of a new strategic partnership to be entered into by the 
Russian and Chinese governments in the energy sector.
14 Later, in February 2005, news 
agencies reported that a Chinese bank group led by China Export-Import Bank (EXIM 
Bank) had agreed to lend US$6 billion to Rosneft (the new owner of Yuganskneftegas). 
The loan was believed to be a pre-payment for future crude oil deliveries from Rosneft 
estimated at 50 million tones over a five year period.
15 Even though the Russian Foreign 
Ministry downplayed Chinese involvement in the Yuganskneftegas take-over the next 
day, the involvement of CNPC in Yukos activities has continued. To illustrate, Yukos 
and CNPC lobbied for a new pipeline from Angarsk in Siberia to a Chinese refinery site 
in Daqing, although it now appears that Russia is more likely to build a pipeline to their 
Nakhodka port on the  Russian Pacific and not ship directly to China.  
 
MinMetals/Noranda 
  Activity of Chinese SOEs on the resource acquisition front has been a factor in 
news  reports  linking  China's  MinMetals  Corporation  (a  Chinese  SOE)  to  Noranda, 
Canada's  largest  mining  company.  In  September  2004,  China  MinMetals  Corporation 
announced  it  had  entered  into  exclusive  negotiations  to  purchase  Noranda  Inc.  (the 
leading Canadian copper and zinc miner). Their offer was reported to  comprise cash 
                                                 
14 BBC  News,  Chinese  may  get  Yukos  oil  stake,  December  20,  2004  http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-
/2/hi/business/4134769.stm 
15 Carl  Mortished,  Yukos  deal  backed  by  $6bn  loan  from  China,  Times  Online,  February  2,  2005 
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,17549-1466798,00.html 12 
(about US$5 billion) and the distribution to shareholders of some of Noranda holdings 
(i.e.  Noranda's  aluminium  business).
16  In  March  2005,  the  talks  broke  down  when 
Noranda  bought  41%  share  of  its  subsidiary,  Falconbridge,  to  increase  its  market 
capitalization.  
  It was believed that MinMetals would no longer be able to afford to bid for a joint 
Noranda-Flaconbridge  company.  Instead,  MinMetals  and  Falconbridge  pledged  to 
discuss a possible strategic alliance. The proposed buyout spurred much discussion in 
Canadian media of China's human rights and fair trade record as well as strategic aspects 
of foreign ownership of Canadian resources. David Kilgour, an independent MP, stated 
that because MinMetals was an SOE the takeover would be, in effect, a nationalization of 
a private Canadian company by a branch of the Chinese government.
17 In June 2005, the 
Canadian government introduced a bill that would allow the federal government to block 
any foreign takeover of a Canadian company on national security grounds giving the 
government the right to review buy-outs even if the value was less than C$250 million 
(the then current threshold). The industry minister said the changes were not a result of 
Chinese interest in Canadian natural resource companies.
18  
                                                 
16 http://news.moneycentral.msn.com September 24, 2004. 
17 The Wall Street Journal, July 15, 2005, accessed through http://www.post-gazette.com  
18 The Wall Street Journal, July 15, 2005, accessed through http://www.post-gazette.com  13 
 
CNOOC/Unocal 
  China's  National  Offshore  Oil  Corporation  (CNOOC)  unsolicited  cash  bid  of 
US$18.5 billion for the American oil firm, Unocal, is a further illustration both of foreign 
resource acquisition activity and the political response in larger OECD countries to such 
bids. The CNOOC offer topped an earlier (cash and shares) Chevron bid for Unocal by 
US$2 billion, and in July Chevron raised its offer to US$17.1 billion and won the backing 
of Unocal's Board. At the onset of August, CNOOC withdrew its bid for Unocal due to 
strong political opposition in the US. 
  The  CNOOC  bid  spurred  concerns  in  the  US  over  national  security  issues 
connected  to  foreign  buyouts  and  also  started  discussion  of  government-supported 
activities of Chinese firms in the US. The House of Representatives voted in favour of a 
resolution stating that allowing CNOOC to buy Unocal would “threaten to impair the 
national  security  of  the  United  States”.
19  American  commentary  also  suggested  that 
CNOOC's bid was unfair because $13 billion out of the US$18.5 billion offer for Unocal 
came directly from low- or no-interest loans from the Chinese government (via CNOOC's 
state  owned  parent  company  and  the  Industrial  and  Commercial  Bank  of  China). 
Chevron's vice-chairman, Peter Robertson, called for the bid to be referred to the WTO 
                                                 
19 Steve  Lohr,  The  Big  Tug  of  War  Over  Unocal,  The  New  York  Times,  July  6,  2005, 
http://www.nytimes.com 14 
on the grounds that China was buying “a critical resource like energy with free money”.
20  
CNOOC's response was to call for a review of the bid by the Committee of Foreign 
Investments in the US (CFIUS) arguing the controversy over the bid was purely political. 
CNOOC's representatives pointed out that 70% of Unocal's oil and gas reserves were 
located in Asia, and that only 1% of American consumption was secured by Unocal's 
American production.
21  
  Several American commentators argued that as long as there was a worldwide 
market for oil, controlling oil and gas reserves was not vital for national security.
22 Other 
analysts emphasised that China's foreign reserves were held mostly in US treasury bills, 
suggesting that if the Chinese stopped buying these, interest rates in the US could rise 
which could then increase inflation and decrease consumer spending.
23 But it was also 
argued this could happen if the Chinese decided to retaliate against any  politically driven 
blockage of Chinese takeovers. In addition to treating oil as a national security product, 
concerns were also expressed over Chinese access to industrial technology that could be 
used  for  military  purposes.  The  issue  was  Unocal's  underwater  terrain-mapping 
technology which, it was argued, could also be used for military submarine navigation. 
 
                                                 
20 Dow Jones Newswires, Chevron Executive Calls for WTO Review of CNOOC Unocal Bid, July 1, 
2005, http://money.cnn.com  
21 BBC News, China Calls for Calm on Oil Deal, June 28, 2005, http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk  
22 Steve  Lohr, Unocal Bid Opens Up New Issues of  Security, The New  York Times, July 13, 2005, 
http://www.nytimes.com  
23 Buttonwood, China Syndrome, The Economist, http://economist.com and Steve Lohr, The Big Tug of 
War Over Unocal 15 
CNPC/PetroKazakhstan 
  A  further  resource  related  acquisition  involves  the  China  National  Petroleum 
Corporation  (CNPC)  buyout  of  the  Canadian-listed  company  PetroKazakhstan 
(PetroKaz) for US$4.2 billion. When the bid was announced on August 22, 2005, it had 
already been approved by the PetroKazakhstan Board of Directors and recommended to 
shareholders.
24  The  Chinese  bid  was  subsequently  challenged  by  the  Indian  Oil  and 
Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) who were also interested in PetroKaz. ONGC claimed 
that  CNPC  was  given  unfair  chance  to  revise  their  bid  after  ONGC  bid  had  been 
submitted.
25  
The CNPC bid raised a series of legal issues since under Kazakh law the state 
may exercise its rights to block any sale of assets in the country.
26 Also, Lukoil (Russia's 
biggest oil company) filed a claim with an arbitration court in Stockholm arguing that a 
shareholders  agreement  gave  them  the  right  to  buy  PetroKazakhstan's  interest  in  an 
existing petroleum venture (the Turgai project) if there were any changes in the control 
over PetroKaz.
27 In Canada, Lukoil filed a claim with the Alberta Court requesting the 
arrangement to be deferred until the Stockholm Arbitration Institute makes its decision. 
The Canadian court has approved the deal and CNPC bought PetroKaz on October 26
th 
for US$55 per share or US$4.2 billion total. The CNPC offer was backed by the Kazakh 
                                                 
24 PetroKazakhstan Inc. Press Release, PetroKazakhstan Announces Sale to CNPC International Ltd. For 
Approximately US$4.18 Billion, August 22, 2005, http://www.petrokazakhstan.com/news  
25 The  Hindu.  Business,  India  Alleges  Foul  Play  in  PetroKazakhstan  Bid,  October  18,  2005, 
http://www.thehindu.com  
26 EIU ViewsWire, Kazakhstan Energy: Turning to the East, August 17, 2005, http://www.viewswire.com  
27 Bloomberg. 2005. Lukoil Files in Stockholm to Stop Kazakh Venture Sale (Update 3), October 5. 
accessed through www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000080&sid=aoVIm7DNQB9k&refer=asia# 16 
government who would pay US$1.4 billion for a 33% stake in PetroKaz.
28  
 
2.2. Manufacturing Company Situations 
Lenovo/IBM 
  The acquisition of IBM's PC hardware division by the Chinese Lenovo Group (the 
leader  in  PC  sales  in  China)  illustrates  the  foreign  acquisition  activities  of  Chinese 
manufacturing based groups. In December 2004, Lenovo agreed to pay US$1.75 billion 
for the IBM PC unit (including US$0.5 billion of the unit's debt assumed by Lenovo), 
with the sale giving IBM US$650 million in cash, US$600 million in securities and an 
18.9% stake in  Lenovo. The  arrangement makes  Lenovo the world's third-largest PC 
maker behind Dell and Hewlett-Packard. Lenovo will be permitted to use the IBM brand 
for five years and IBM will support Lenovo with marketing and corporate sales.
29  
  In  January  2005,  CFIUS  discussed  concerns  that  the  deal  could  compromise 
national  security  and  decided  to  review  the  merger.  Concerns  raised  included  the 
possibility of industrial espionage and the transfer of sensitive technology from IBM to 
Lenovo.
30 In March 2005, CFIUS ruled that the acquisition posed no threat to national 
security and the sale was completed in May. 
                                                 
28 BBC News, CNPC Secures PetroKazakhstan Bid, October 26, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk  
29 Michael  Kanellos,  IBM  sells  PC  group  to  Lenovo,  News.com 
http://news.com.com/IBM+sells+PC+group+to+Lenovo/2100-1042_3-5482284.html 
30 Jeffrey  Burt,  IBM-Lenovo  deal  raises  concerns,  eWeek,  January  31,  2005, 
http://www.eweek.com/print_article2/0,1217,a=143565,00.asp  17 
 
Haier/Maytag 
  The bid by the Chinese private group Haier for the US appliance producer Maytag 
reflects potential Chinese insourcing and access to OECD distribution networks. In June 
2005,  Haier  Group  (a  major  Chinese  fridge  and  washing-machine  manufacturer) 
announced it was interested in purchasing Maytag. The Chinese offer of US$1.28 billion 
started a bidding war with US Ripplewood and Whirpool who in turn offered to pay 
US$1.13 billion and US$1.3 billion respectively. Whirpool's offer of US$17 per share 
included cash and stock options and was higher than Ripplewood's $14 per share and 
Haier's  $16  (cash  only).
31  Haier's  bid  was  made  subject  to  a  review  of  Maytag's 
confidential records, and on July 20, Haier announced it was withdrawing its bid. Some 
analysts suggest that Haier dropped out of the bidding due to difficulties in integrating 
Maytag's  business  with  their  own
32.  Maytag  was  eventually  bought  by  Whirlpool  in 
August of 2005. 
 
SAIC and Nanjing/MG Rover 
  Further Chinese FDI acquisition activities have involved two bids made by rival 
                                                 
31 Andrew Ross Sorkin, Timothy L. O'Brien, Whirlpool Makes Unsolicited Bid for Maytag, Creating 3-
Way Race, The New York Times, July 18, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com  
32 Eric Bosshard, FTN Midwest Securities, cited in China's Haier out of Hoover Race, BBC News, July 
20, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk  18 
Chinese SOEs for control of the UK car group MG Rover. In spring 2005, offers to buy 
MG  Rover  came  from  two  Chinese  companies:  Shanghai  Automotive  Industry 
Corporation  (SAIC)  and  Nanjing  Automobile  Corporation.  Rover  had  been  placed  in 
receivership following bankruptcy, and negotiations involved both the receiver and the 
UK government since local employment issues were raised. Earlier in the year, after a 
first failed attempt to take over Rover's assets, SAIC bought the rights to sell two Rover 
models in China. It was believed that each of the two bids would result in the relocation 
of  some  of  Rover's  activity  to  China,  but  each  also  proposed  to  keep  part  of  the 
production in the UK, specifically MG sports cars and high value saloons. SAIC planned 
to relocate engine design and production to China while Nanjing would move Rover's 
small-  and  medium-sized  cars  production  lines.  Rover  was  later  sold  to  Nanjing 
Automotive Corporation for an undisclosed sum.  
 
2.3. Other Recent Chinese Foreign Mergers and Acquisitions 
  Additional Chinese merger and acquisition (M&A) activities further illustrate the 
trend of growing Chinese involvement in global FDI. These vary in size, form, and extent 
of  Chinese  participation.  These  are  typically  smaller,  but  are  diverse  by  activity  and 
country. 
  By way of illustration, in 2004, Chinese TCL International Holding Ltd. (TCL) 
bought a majority stake in French Thomson television and DVD business, and Schneider 
Electronics  (a  bankrupt  German  television  manufacturer,  ￿8.2  million).  TCL  also 19 
initiated a mobile telephone acquisition from Alcatel but this failed due to rising losses 
and tough market conditions. In 2004, China National Bluestar launched an unsuccessful 
bid to buy South Korean Ssangyong Motors (the value of the bid estimated at US$600 
million). In February 2004, Shanghai Baosteel Group announced a US$1.4 billion joint-
venture  steel  mill  in  Brazil  with  Companhia  Vale  do  Rio  Doce.  In  October  2004, 
Yanzhou Coal Mining Co. agreed to buy Australian Southland Coal Mine for US$23.4 
million.  Later,  in  December  2004,  Huaneng  Group  (power  producer)  agreed  to  pay 
US$226.9 million for half of OzGen (the Australian subsidiary of American InterGen).  
  In  March  2005,  Beijing  PetroChina  Co.  Ltd.  and  Enbridge  Inc.  announced  a 
planned partnership to build a new pipeline from Alberta's oil-sands to the Canadian 
West Coast where the oil would be shipped to Chinese ports (valued at US$2-2.5 billion). 
In May, Sinopec (China Petroleum & Chemical Corp.) paid CDN$150 million for a part 
of another oil-sand project in Alberta.
33 In April 2005, Harbin Measuring & Cutting Tool 
Group bought a German measuring equipment manufacturer for ￿9.5 million. In April 
2005,  CNOOC  purchased  a  17%  stake  in  MEG  Energy  Corp.  (CDN$150  million),  a 
Calgary, Alberta, energy firm with an oil-sands project. In June 2005, Huffy Corp. (a US 
bicycle maker) covered its debts issuing new shares and offering them to its creditor – 
Sinosure Group, who now possesses a 30% stake and has the option of acquiring a further 
21% over the next five years.  
  This list of Chinese FDI activities is by no means complete; the examples merely 
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show that China is deepening its involvement in mergers and acquisitions abroad in many 
fields and the value of transactions (either proposed or actual) is increasing.21 
3.  Systemic  Considerations  Prompted  by  China's 
Buyouts 
  Proposed or actual buyouts of OECD companies by Chinese SOEs and private 
groups  have  inevitably  prompted  discussion  outside  of  China  of  a  suitable  policy 
response. It is acknowledged that competitive and open capital markets imply no special 
issues  should  arise  if  purchasers  of  companies  in  the  OECD  are  located  in  China  as 
against  elsewhere.  Alternatively,  concerns  over  national  security  considerations, 
subsidization,  lack  of  transparency,  combined  with  the  absence  of  clear  international 
rules over cross border acquisitions has caused unease in the OECD. 
  Concerns  focus  on  alleged  fairness  of  transactions  (whether  subsidization  is 
involved), the transparency of corporate organization and form on the buying side, and 
alleged national security considerations. The first two concerns appear to be new to a 
discussion of cross border acquisitions, and also seem far reaching in their implications. 
The  preoccupation  with  national  security  has  arisen  previously  with  acquisitions 
originating from other countries outside of China, for example Japanese investments in 
the  US.  These  issues  have  also  not  been  central  to  recent  efforts  to  move  towards 
multilaterally negotiated international rules in the investment and competition policy (the 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) and WTO competition policy negotiations), 
and neither are they covered by existing bilateral investment treaties.  
 22 
3.1. Subsidization  
  A central issue raised by recent Chinese buyouts, regardless of their outcome, is 
that of subsidization of purchase; whether and how subsidies are involved, and whether 
their presence justifies a policy response. This issue was recently raised by the Chief 
Executive Officer of Chevron in connection with the CNOOC bid for Unocal, who in 
turn suggested that there may be reasons to consider a WTO action in connection with 
subsidization.
34  The  issue  of  subsidizing  low-  or  no-interest  loans  made  by  China's 
Central Bank to SOEs for foreign acquisitions is in question. WTO disciplines do not 
apply as there are no issues raised by buyouts regarding barriers to goods trade
35; the 
issue instead concerns subsidization of cross border acquisitions, a matter not addressed 
by WTO arrangements.  
  Thus, if a central bank (in this case the Chinese Central Bank) makes low interest 
loans to state owned enterprises for the acquisition of companies abroad there are no 
internationally agreed disciplines restraining them. Such instances have not seemingly 
arisen in the past since it is both the size of Chinese reserves and the closeness of the 
Chinese state (through SOEs) to the Central Bank that has resulted in these loans. This 
policy direction may thus appear sensible and logical to Chinese eyes, but to those versed 
in international trade law, trade remedy, and subsidization, it raises the issue of whether 
international disciplines should now be negotiated restraining their use in this way. The 
                                                 
34 CNN  Money,  Chevron  Executive  Calls  for  WTO  Review  of  CNOOC  Unocal  Bid,  July  1,  2005, 
http://money.cnn.com  
35 This  puts  on  one  side,  for  now,  limited  elements  of  the  WTO,  such  as  Trade  Related  Investment 
Measures (TRIMs) which do discipline the ways in which approvals of cross border acquisitions can be 
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allegation  is  unfairness  of  acquisition  activity,  just  as  subsidization  of  production  or 
exports targets unfairness of trade which the WTO deals through disciplines in the GATT 
1994.  
  The obvious analogues are a ban on the use of export subsidies in Article 16 of 
GATT 1994 (but with conditional use allowed in agriculture), and the allowed use of 
countervailing  duties  only  where  both  subsidization  and  injury  are  established  by 
domestic tribunal process (with constraints on transparency of process) under Article 6 of 
GATT 1994.  
  The WTO GATT ban on export subsidies on the goods side is usually rationalized 
by  the  global  efficiency  considerations  involved  in  removing  distortions  of  trade, 
including  both  those  that  restrain  trade  (tariffs)  and  those  that  promote  trade  (export 
subsidies). An additional argument usually made is that the GATT negotiating process in 
1947  was  envisaged  as  converting  all  existing  interventions  in  trade  into  tariff  form, 
thereby  allowing  tariffs  as  the  sole  negotiable  instrument  for  bindings  and  tariff 
reductions  in  subsequent  negotiations.  In  the  case  of  capital  flows  and  foreign 
acquisitions, similar global efficiency arguments follow given the equivalence between 
goods and factor flows, but as no tariff equivalent (a single negotiable barrier instrument) 
applies the second of these arguments appears less relevant.  
  The  analogous  arguments  to  these  used  to  justify  countervailing  duties  as 
measures  to  offset  subsidization  of  goods  flows  seem  more  difficult  to  make  in  the 
foreign acquisition case. Generalized arguments in favour of trade remedy laws often 
centre  on  concerns  over  predatory  pricing  by  foreign  suppliers  in  domestic  markets, 24 
acknowledgement of the seeming unfairness of preferential foreign suppliers treatment, 
and  arguments  that  without  a  trade  remedy  safety  net  in  place  domestic  political 
coalitions  of  home  producers  would  be  even  less  willing  to  accept  the  outcomes  of 
internationally agreed negotiations which lower tariff barriers. 
  In discussing their application to subsidization of cross border  acquisition, we 
note that a preponderance of the arguments made in favour of trade remedy laws are 
discounted by academic economists. Many argue the illogicality on national (as distinct 
from narrower producer) interest grounds of limiting the opportunities available to buy 
goods  from  abroad  more  cheaply  if  they  are  being  dumped  or  subsidized  into  local 
markets. They often dispute the presence of predatory pricing since new entrants would 
return to domestic markets and undercut any foreign competitors if they attempted to 
raise prices above competitive levels after engaging in pricing behaviour to drive out 
domestic  competition.  Also,  many  dispute  arguments  applying  notions  of  fairness  to 
pricing behaviour, arguing that fairness considerations more appropriately apply to the 
evaluation of market outcomes on distributional grounds, such as who gains and who 
loses in income or economic welfare, not to the setting of prices per se. 
  Applied to cross border investment and acquisition issues, it is difficult to assert 
arguments  of  predation  since  asset  acquisitions  are  one  time  transactions.  Indeed, 
concerning  national  (and  shareholder)  interests,  the  argument  would  seem  to  be  that 
foreign subsidization of acquisitions is welcomed since domestic sellers of assets will 
typically receive a higher price. Also, generalized arguments of fairness would receive a 
similar treatment to those made on the goods side. And arguments about safety nets and 25 
the political acceptability of negotiated liberalization affecting other instruments would 
seem not to apply since liberalization of other instruments does not arise. 
  In  short,  generalized  arguments  about  fairness  and  subsidization  of  foreign 
acquisitions of domestic firms will likely continue to be made as Chinese buyouts occur; 
however, but these seem to apply largely to the management of acquired firms whose 
managerial positions may suffer. While the subsidy issue could be a lead issue for a new 
international negotiation covering global barriers to factors flows, in dealing with issues 
of  foreign  acquisitions,  new  arguments  rather  than  analogies  to  dumping  and 
subsidization of goods flows would seemingly need to surface. 
 
3.2. Transparency 
  A second issue at stake is the transparency of structure and organizational form of 
the entities involved.
36 The concern in the OECD is that many Chinese SOEs accrue 
losses and do not comply with codes of corporate governance and transparency to which 
OECD companies largely adhere. Acquiring firms may experience financial difficulties 
causing  later  adjustment  problems,  and  be  motivated  by  politically  appointed 
management seeking non profit motives. 
  Understanding in Western literature of how Chinese SOEs operate is not that well 
developed  and  there  are  many  diverse  forms  such  enterprises  take,  with  national, 
                                                 
36 And not the transparency of how asset transactions occur in these cases (such as any insider trading in 
stock purchase. 26 
provincial  and  municipal  governments  involved,  and  also  joint  ventures.  Recently, 
Whalley and Zhang (2005) have suggested a model of Chinese SOEs as entities with 
politically appointed management whose losses are typically recapitalized by the banking 
system and who often operate so as to maximize size rather than profit. This is largely 
attributed to the personal networking benefits that accrue to management from size. As 
such,  a  concern  for  OECD  policy  makers  is  the  involvement  of  large  viable  OECD 
companies with entities whose financial security is intertwined with domestic political 
structure  in  China.  The  fear  underscores  possible  bankruptcies,  adjustment  costs,  and 
disruption from shifting political tides in China.  
  The precise form that ownership and corporate control over collectively-owned 
and  controlled  enterprises  in  China  takes  is  both  complicated  and  puzzling.  The 
complexity of organizational forms that Chinese SOEs assume can make it difficult to 
distinguish  between  a  privately  and  publicly-owned  company.  Lenovo  (the  Chinese 
computer  manufacturer)  who  received  much  media  attention  with  their  successful 
purchase of IBM's PC business serves as an example. Lenovo was originally established 
in 1984 and then incorporated in Hong Kong four years later. As of 1994, it has been 
listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and since 1995 it has also been trading in the 
US  through  the  American  Depositary  Receipt  Level  I  Programme.  These  listing 
arrangements  can  be  taken  to  suggest  that  Lenovo  is  a  privately-owned  company. 
However, the ownership structure of Lenovo's stock implies that a 42.5% controlling 
stake is held by Legend Holdings who in turn are controlled by the Chinese Academy of 
Natural Sciences (who own 65% of stock) which, in turn, assume further agency control 27 
through its financing and appointment structure.
37  
  Recent literature on Chinese SOEs
38 estimates that, as of 2001, of the 1,134 listed 
companies in China, 61.4% are under local government control, 12.6% are under central 
government  control,  3.4%  are  collectively  controlled  and  12.8%  are  privately  owned 
(5.2%  are  unaccounted  for).
39  Privately-owned  companies  are  still  a  minority  among 
listed companies, but their share is steadily growing. In 1999, according to Broadman 
(2001), Chinese SOEs accounted for 63% of gross value added of all enterprises, and 
70% of employment in the industrial sector.  
  Hence, allowing large OECD entities to come under control of Chinese SOEs 
which  themselves  are  potentially  financially  insecure  and  opaque  in  management 
structure and accountability raises OECD concerns. The policy issue at stake is whether 
firms engaged in international acquisitions should also subjected to internationally agreed 
standards of governance and accountability, much like listing requirements on the New 
York  and  other  stock  exchanges.  Many  of  the  Chinese  SOEs  involved  in  these 
transactions have no listing requirements to meet.  
  An additional question is whether existing codes of conduct relating to corporate 
governance provide sufficient resolution. The central code is represented by the OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance originally developed in 1998 and revised in 2004. 
The  principles  aim  to  “assist  OECD  and  non-OECD  governments  in  their  efforts  to 
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38 Bigsten, Liu and Zheng (2002), Cull and Xu (2000 and 2003). 
39 Fan and Wang (2004) and Tan, Wang and Zhang (2005) cited in Liu (2005). 28 
evaluate  and  improve  the  legal,  institutional  and  regulatory  framework  for  corporate 
governance  in  their  countries,  and  to  provide  guidance  and  suggestions  for  stock 
exchanges, investors, corporations, and other parties that have a role in the process of 
developing good corporate governance”.
40 These principles characterize transparency as 
the timely and accurate disclosure of all information relating to a corporation, including 
financial and operating results of companies (balance sheets, profit and loss statements, 
cash flow statements), objectives, major share ownership and voting rights, the selection 
process and remuneration policy of the board and key executives. It also includes any 
foreseeable risk factors, the content of any internal corporate governance code and human 
resources policies, and information on related party
41 transactions that may impact the 
performance of the company are all to be disclosed. Observance of these guidelines is 
however at the discretion of national regulators. 
  Most stock exchanges in the world adopt similar requirements for publicly listed 
companies. Most are rigid and detailed, especially in relation to accounting statements 
and audits. For instance, the London Stock Exchange requires at least three-year record 
of independent revenue earning business and a normal, commercial based relationship 
with any 30% or more shareholder such that the listed company is capable of operating 
and making decisions independently of the shareholder at all times.
42 Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange  requirements  are  at  least  HK$50  million  profit  in  the  last  three  years  and 
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42 London Stock Exchange Listing Rules accessed through www.globalfinanceonline.com/london-stock-
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require  that  a  company's  accounts  be  prepared  in  accordance  with  Hong  Kong  or 
International Financial Reporting Standards or generally accepted accounting principles 
in the US.
43 The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) listing standards require aggregate 
three years pretax earnings of US$10 million as per domestic listing standards or US$100 
million  as  per  worldwide  standards.
44  NYSE  rules  also  stress  the  importance  of 
independent directors and an audit committee. The issue is whether these requirements 
and any additional standards should be set for foreign acquisitions by non-listed entities 
in light of concerns over the Chinese buyout situation. 
 
3.3. National Security  
  Most countries exhibit laws and regulations that restrict foreign investments in 
industries  considered  sensitive  to  national  security  or  sovereignty.  Some  regulations 
provide state authorities the right to review proposed foreign investment. Industries in 
question  usually  include:  telecommunications,  air  transport,  public  utilities,  research, 
production and trade in arms, ammunition, and explosives. Some countries also restrict 
and review foreign investments due to their potential impact on public safety and health, 
public  order,  national  economy  or  fledgling  national  industries.  Chinese  buyouts 
seemingly raise no particular security concerns. 
                                                 
43 Hong  Kong  Stock  Exchange  Basic  Listing  Requirements  for  Equities  accessible  through 
www.hkex.com.hk/issuer/listhk/equities.htm. 
44 New  York  Stock  Exchange  Listing  Standards  accessible  through 
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  In  the  1980s,  similar  concerns  were  raised  over  US  acquisitions  by  Japanese 
companies.  As  a  result,  in  1988  the  American  Congress  approved  the  Exon-Florio 
Provision of the Defence Production Act which gave the President the authority to block 
any  foreign  acquisitions,  mergers,  or  takeovers  of  American  companies  deemed 
threatening  to  US  national  security.  The  legislation  did  not  define  national  security 
leaving this term to be broadly interpreted and administered by the Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States (CFIUS).
45  
  The  Exon-Florio  provision,  amended  in  1993  (called  the  Byrd  Amendment), 
required that CFIUS investigate proposed foreign acquisitions if the acquiring company 
was controlled by or acted on behalf of a  foreign  government.
46 The   considerations 
which guide CFIUS include among others: how the potential foreign acquisition might 
affect  the  technological  leadership  of  the  US  in  areas  related  to  national  security, 
domestic  production  needed  for  national  defence  projects,  capacity  and  capability  of 
domestic industries related to national security, and weapons sales to countries supporting 
terrorism.  
  CFIUS proceedings are confidential and official information on the reviews is 
whitheld. According to Jackson (2005), CFIUS has investigated 25 cases out of 1,500 
notifications. 13 transactions were withdrawn upon notice of a full CFIUS review, twelve 
were sent to the President for final decision and only one was prohibited. The prohibited 
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Research Service Report for Congress, Order Code RS22197, July 15. 
46 Department  of  Treasury,  Committee  on  Foreign  Investments  in  the  United  States,  Exon-Florio 
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takeover involved Mamco Manufacturing Company (aerospace parts manufacturer) and 
the China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation (CATIC) who acted 
as a purchasing agent for the Chinese Ministry of Defence. CATIC was ordered to sell 
Mamco by President Reagan in 1990. 
  National  security  concerns  where  a  proposed  foreign  acquisition  involves  key 
natural resources or technology with a military usage potential have been largely centred 
on  the  US  (rather  than  the  EU)  and  have  also  largely  attracted  media  attention  in 
connection with the recent wave of Chinese buyouts. Among the recent proposed Chinese 
buyouts the key cases which generated national security concerns are Lenovo's IBM PC 
takeover and CNOOC's unsuccessful bid for Unocal. The MinMetals potential bid for 
Noranda in Canada  generated a new requirement for government approval of foreign 
acquisitions on national security grounds. The Lenovo case generated concerns over the 
possible transfer of sensitive technology and possible corporate espionage issues and was 
evaluated both by members of the CFIUS and the Departments of Justice and Homeland 
Security.
47  The  transaction  was  subsequently  reviewed  positively  by  CFIUS  and 
approved as non-threatening to national security. A similar case was raised in 2003, when 
the  CFIUS  refused  to  approve  a  merger  of  Global  Crossing's  telecommunications 
business and the Hong Kong-based Hutchison-Whampoa on security grounds.
48  
  Concerns again arose over national security with CNOOC in connection with the 
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http://www.esecurityplanet.com/trends/article.php/3463471 accessed August 30, 2005 
48 The Hutchinson-Whampoa bid was subsequently withdrawn and Global Crossing was then taken over 
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threat to the national supply of oil and underwater terrain-mapping technology which 
could  be  used  for  military  purposes.  Facing  the  investigation  and  strong  political 
opposition CNOOC withdrew its bid for Unocal.  
   Similarly, concerns over national security were raised in Canada when MinMetals 
negotiated Noranda's takeover but had more to do with the efficiency of the Canadian 
economy  and  possible  political  pressure  from  the  Chinese  government  versus  an 
immediate threat to the national resource supply.
49  
 
3.4. Multilateral Negotiations and Foreign Acquisitions 
  It  is  relevant  to  any  discussion  of  possible  new  initiatives  in  the  global  trade 
negotiations  (prompted  by  the  Chinese  buyout  situation)  to  assess  prior  negotiating 
efforts on investment and related foreign acquisitions to see if the central issues raised by 
the Chinese situation have received attention.  
  The first of these is the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI).
50 The MAI 
negotiations  were  launched  at  the  Annual  Meeting  of  the  OECD  Council  at  the 
Ministerial level in May 1995 and expected to lead to a proposed international treaty 
covering all aspects of investment. The key objectives were to establish a multilateral 
framework  for  international  investment  with  liberalization  of  investment  regimes, 
                                                 
49 Anne Golden, Do Our Foreign Investment Laws Still Have Legs?, Globe and Mail, December 1, 2004, 
accessed through http://www.conferenceboard.ca/press/2005/OpEds/041201_FDI_Op-ed.asp, accessed 
August 30, 2005. 
50 Unless  otherwise  specified,  this  section  is  based  on  MAI  documentation  available  through  OECD 
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investment  protection,  effective  dispute  settlement  procedures,  and  to  enhance 
international co-operation with respect to investment and the development of world-wide 
rules on foreign direct investment.   
  According  to  the  draft  text,  government-owned  or  controlled  entities  were 
considered investors along with other natural or legal persons (Part II, paragraph 1), and 
no  explicit  objectives  were  stated  for  restraints  of  government  actions  towards  cross 
border acquisitions. The agreement was to be comprehensive, focused on all forms of 
investment including enterprises and individuals, to apply to all sectors and to all levels 
of government, and to centre on the key WTO principles of national treatment and non-
discrimination/most favoured nation (MFN). It was also intended to avoid conflict with 
other multilateral agreements such as General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), 
Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), and Agreement on Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) under WTO.  
  Issues of subsidization, transparency, and national security discussed here were 
not raised in the draft text of the MAI. The 1998 Draft Agreement, however, contained 
many provisions regarding the treatment of investors and investments, such as MFN,  
national  treatment,  temporary  entry  and  stay  rules  for  investors  and  key  personnel, 
employment  and  performance  requirements,  rules  covering  monopolies,  privatization, 
and state enterprises, recognition and authorization procedures, clauses on intellectual 
property, corporate practices, labour and environment, investment protection (including 
expropriation and compensation, transfers, subrogation and others), dispute settlement 
mechanism  on  state-state  level  and  investor-state  level,  exceptions  and  safeguards, 34 
financial services, and taxation.  
  Transparency in the MAI was characterized as transparency of the rule regime and 
did not cover transparency of actors involved in conducting investment. The exceptions 
and safeguards section contained only general provisions on the protection of national 
interests  relating  to  times  of  war,  production  of  arms  and  disclosure  of  sensitive 
information. Subsidization of state-owned companies involved in overseas investment 
was  not  explicitly  discussed.  Negotiations  ended  in  December  1998  after  conflicts 
occurred within the OECD over national sovereignty and protection of national cultural 
industries and opposition from civil society  groups, Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs) and developing countries. In 2001, discussions on a MAI resumed in the WTO's 
Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and Investment. A WTO agreement 
was  to  only  cover  FDI  excluding  portfolio  investment  and  other  short  term  capital 
flows
51,  and  as  of  yet,  no  formal  negotiations  on  a  MAI  have  been  launched  in  the 
WTO.
52 
  Additional negotiations which are potentially related to issues covering Chinese 
cross border acquisitions involves competition policy. Elements of competition policy 
discussions can be found in various parts of the WTO including the GATT 1994, TRIPs 
and the GATS.  
  In  1980,  United  Nations  Conference  on  Trade  and  Development  (UNCTAD) 
                                                 
51 Singh (2001) 
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adopted a Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of 
Restrictive Business Procedures; however, a full scale discussion of competition policy 
and its relations to trade was not raised in the WTO until the mid-1990s. This occurred in 
1996 at the Singapore Ministerial where a Working Group on Trade and Competition 
Policy (WGTCP) was established to “study issues raised by Members relating to the 
interaction between trade and competition policy, including anticompetitive practices in 
order  to  identify  any  areas  that  may  merit  further  consideration  in  the  WTO 
framework”.
53  In  contrast  to  the  MAI,  there  have  been  no  official  negotiations  on  a 
Multilateral Agreement on Competition Policy (MAC).
54  
  There were five pillars on which the case for MAC was first built in the WTO.
55 
The need to harmonize different national competition laws (especially in mergers review 
procedures),  promoting  market  access  for  imports,  preventing  abuse  of  anti-dumping 
procedures, preventing abuse of intellectual property rights, and cross-border cartels.
56 
Subsequent  discussions  within  the  Working  Group  on  Trade  and  Competition  Policy 
revealed a gap not only between the OECD and the developing countries on most of these 
issues but also among the developed countries. Faced with a lack of consensus, the WTO 
Working  Group  limited  further  discussion  to:  'hard  core'  cartels,  principles  of  non-
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55 Bhattacharjea (2004). 
56 The discussion involved the difficulty in the extraterritorial application of national competition policy 
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discrimination, transparency
57 and procedural fairness, voluntary co-operation between 
countries,  and  capacity  building  in  developing  countries.
58  Again  the  issues  of 
subsidization, transparency and national security raised by the Chinese buyouts case did 
not arise.  
 
3.5. Bilateral Investment Treaties  
  Independent  of  the  multilateral  negotiations  on  MAI  and  MAC,  countries  are 
committed to further disciplines through bilateral investment treaties and the issue here is 
how these relate to Chinese buyouts. The first Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) was 
signed  in  1959  between  Germany  and  Pakistan,  and  since  that  time,  the  number  of 
concluded  BITs  has  increased  steadily.  There  are  currently  2,392  BITs  in  existence 
(about 30% of these have not been ratified and have not entered into force).
59  
  BITs  usually  typically  cover  scope  and  definition  of  investment,  reciprocal 
promotion  and  protection  of  investments,  rules  governing  the  establishment  and 
admission of investments, national and MFN treatment, expropriation and compensation, 
transfer of funds and dispute settlement mechanism on both state-state and investor-state 
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30, 2005, UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIT/2005/1. UNCTAD provides a comprehensive database of more than 
1,800 BITs' texts. See http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/DocSearch____779.aspx  37 
level
60. They do not cover the key issues discussed here: subsidization, transparency of 
actors involved in investment or national security issues. 
  UNCTAD sources indicate that China has signed approx. to 120 BITs since the 
first BIT concluded with Sweden in March 1982. With 69 BITs concluded between 1990 
and 1999, China is currently ranked the second most common signatory country in the 
world with Germany being the first.
61 Most of China's BITs are with other developing 
economies and about one third of these have not yet entered into force. 
                                                 
60 For a discussion of BITs see for example Peterson (2004), Neumayer (2004), Guzman (2004). 
61 See www.unctad.org/iia 38 
4. Concluding Remarks  
  In light of recent Chinese proposed purchases of OECD companies, we argue 
whether  there  should  be  globally  negotiated  rules  covering  cross  border  acquisitions, 
perhaps similar to those governing international goods and services trade under WTO and 
GATT.  
  The recent growth of Chinese outward FDI is related not only to growing Chinese 
foreign reserves due to trade surpluses and inward FDI, but also to recent changes in 
official  Chinese  policy,  now  encouraging  domestic  companies  to  invest  abroad.  The 
approval process for foreign investment has been simplified and companies (especially 
state-owned enterprises) investing abroad in projects related to securing domestic energy 
demand, acquiring advanced technology and new markets, are given credit support at 
preferential interest rates.  
  The recent, widely publicized, cases of Chinese buyout attempts of companies in 
other countries suggest that the main motives for outward FDI are access to resources 
(CNOOC, CNPC and Minmetals cases), new technology (Lenovo case) and distribution 
networks in the target country (Lenovo, Haier and Nanjing cases). The Chinese bids we 
document comprised mostly of cash (between US$1.3 billion and 17.5 billion with the 
higher end offers being in the oil industry) and most are also based on low interest loans 
from the Chinese state controlled banks.  
  Subsidization  of  attempted  foreign  acquisitions  may  be  argued  as  an  unfair 
business practice, but simple analogies between goods and factors flows seemingly do 39 
not  fully  support  the  need  for  a  new  international  negotiation  covering  global  factor 
flows.  The  issue  of  transparency  of  entities  involved,  especially  the  opaqueness  and 
financial insecurity of Chinese SOEs, raises concerns whether they are able to manage 
the purchased businesses in such a way that it sustains the security and stability of local 
workforce,  avoids  the  disruption  of  local  markets  and  does  not  fuel  suspicion  of 
corruption.  Whether  they  should  be  subjected  to  internationally  agreed  corporate 
disclosure  standards,  comply  with  standard  accountability  requirements,  and  be  the 
subject of restraint where potential adjustment issues are posed by financial weakness are 
issues. China's emergence as a global investor may serve not only as a catalyst for a 
wider discussion covering not only cross border acquisitions, but also more broadly for 
cross border flows of factors. 
  The paper also highlights the discussion of Chinese buyouts and national security 
concerns involving the transfer of sensitive technologies, efficiency of the economy in 
the target country and finally the security of resource supply. These issues are most often 
subject to domestic regulations including an approval process and are heavily dependent 
on political reasoning. 
   It can be argued that the Chinese FDI should not be treated differently that those 
of any other country and that Chinese companies cannot be subject to any special rules 
otherwise  not  applicable  to  other  entities;  however,  the  closeness  of  the  Chinese 
government  and  Chinese  companies  as  well  as  financial  structure  of  the  Chinese 
economy, prompt questions on fairness and transparency of transactions. Given China's 
surging economic growth, trade surpluses, accumulation of foreign reserves, and changes 40 
in the official policy stance one can expect growing involvement of Chinese companies 
abroad. The Chinese buyout attempts can thus serve as a catalyst to a broader, systemic 
discussion on global factor flows rules and policy response to governmental interventions 
in cross border acquisitions.41 
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